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Popular Discontent, Revolution, and
Democratization in Egypt in a Globalizing
World
ABDEL-FATTAH MADY*
ABSTRACT

This paper examines how informal, discontent actors in Egypt have
evolved in a globalizing world and their role in the January 25th
revolution. It focuses on the effects of the deteriorating economic and
social conditions in Egypt related to the former regime's policy and the
role of mass media, information, and communication technologies in
facilitating mobilization, recruitment, and eventually the popular
uprising. This paper also discusses the issue of how informal discontent
protesters and groups formulate their goals and organize themselves to
exert pressure on formal institutions of the state. The main conclusion is
that informal actors have not yet managed to develop a sharedpolitical
agenda with a focus on democratic transition in Egypt and have instead
regressed to their own goals and agendas. In light of current political
polarization, this paper concludes that there is a need to form a
historical block on the basis of democracy or a national-unity
government to be able to set priorities and build the desired democratic
system.
INTRODUCTION

Successful regime transitions in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin
America, and Africa have often depended on three factors, and the
presence of at least one of the three has been essential. First, a group of
reformers with a true desire for change within the regime. Second, a
democratic opposition capable of using the limited freedoms granted by
authoritarian leaders to either compel the ruling elites to release their
control over the regime or to negotiate a peaceful transition to
* Abdel-Fattah Mady is Associate Professor of Political Science at Alexandria
University, Egypt. He can be reached at the following addresses: Abdelfattah.Mady
@gmail.com or www.abdelfattahmady.net
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democracy (such a group is known as a "Pact" in the literature of
comparative politics). Third, an end to external support for
authoritarian regimes-or, if previously present, the end of external
obstruction of democratization. All three factors have proved integral.'
Yet, there is a fourth factor: a change from below. Where no
divisions within the ruling elite have emerged or where no democratic
opposition has organized, political regimes have collapsed either under
the pressure of mass demonstrations or at the hands of military
personnel who once supported the regime, or by both factors together
(examples include Romania, Portugal, Zaire, Iran, Haiti, and
Mauritania). External powers have been unable or unwilling to save
existing political regimes in the described circumstances. In some cases
related to this fourth factor, countries such as Romania, Portugal, and
perhaps Mauritania have moved to democracy, but the most common
scenario has been a move to a new form of authoritarianism (Castro in
Cuba, Khomeini in Iran, and Kabila in the Democratic Republic of
Congo) .2
In the Arab countries, the absence of reformers within the ruling
elites and the weakness and fragmentation of the opposition have led to
the fourth transition factor, namely a regime collapse under the
pressure of mass demonstrations. 3 The January 25th revolution in
Egypt demanded the overthrow of the regime of President Hosni
Mubarak. It focused on a set of political and socioeconomic issues,
including emergency laws, police brutality, a lack of democratic
1. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
37-38
(1991);
GEORGE SORENSEN,
DEMOCRACY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION: PROCESS AND PROSPECTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 13-15 (3rd ed. 2008);
RONALD A. FRANCISCO, THE POLITICS OF REGIME TRANSITIONS 65-69 (2000).
2. See generally Richard Snyder, Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining
Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives, in SULTANISTIC REGIMES 59 (H.E. Chehabi &
Juan J. Linz eds., 1998) (examining Iran and Cuba, among other countries); Richard
Snyder, Explaining Transitions from NeopatrimonialDictatorships, 24 COMP. POL. 379
(1992) (studying the Philippines, Haiti, Paraguay, and Zaire as nonrevolutionary cases of
transitions).
3. See generally STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS, PROTEST, REVOLT AND REGIME CHANGE IN THE
ARAB WORLD: ACTORS, CHALLENGES, IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS, (Muriel
Asseburg ed., Meredith Dale trans., 2012), available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/
publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-detaillarticle/arab worldrevolt_
and regime-change.html (collecting together various articles on the changes happening in
the recent Arab world); CENTER FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, THE ARAB REVOLTS AGAINST
NEOLIBERALISM (2011), available at http://www.socialistproject.ca/documents/ArabRevolts
.pdf (collecting together essays on how in 2011 the Arab world, focusing on Egypt,
underwent transition); Abdel-Fattah Mady, Regime Transition Approaches, in ARAB
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Ali AlKuwari & Abdel-fattah
Mady eds., 2009).
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elections and freedoms, corruption, low minimum wages, inflation, and
unemployment. Most revolutionary slogans concerned freedom, dignity,
and social justice.
The core of this article examines the role of popular discontent
groups in the January 25th revolution in Egypt. The article focuses on
several main questions: How have popular, informal discontent actors in
Egypt evolved in globalizing world? What is their role in the January
25th revolution? Finally, how does globalization affect Egypt's move
toward a democratic political system? This article also examines the
effects of globalization on democratization first by looking at
the deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions in Egypt due
to the regime's policies and whether these policies resulted
from globalization and world economic integration. The article then
analyzes the role of mass media and information and communication
technologies (ICT)-especially the Internet and satellite news stationsin facilitating mobilization, recruitment, and eventually the process of
democratization.
To answer the questions posed, the article first examines the
structural explanations for the dominance of informal politics in Egypt
vis-a-vis "legitimate" or formal opposition parties, official unions, and
formal professional syndicates. The article also analyzes informal
networks, values, and discourses of youth protest groups and social
movements as well as the effects of state economic and social policies.
Futhermore, the article treats the issue of how informal protesters and
groups formulate their goals and organize themselves to exert pressure
on formal state institutions. The article continues on to explore the
possible social and political effects of ICT, i.e. the ways and means by
which ICT tools appear to be empowering political actors and eventually
promoting democratization.
Finally, the article addresses the impact of informal political actors
on formal political processes in Egypt. The discussion considers the
behavior of popular youth protesters and groups toward state
institutions and the interactions of informal and formal actors. The
main aim here is to investigate whether those informal actors managed
to develop a political agenda focused on democratic change in Egypt or if
they regressed to prioritizing their own goals and agendas.
I. MUBARAK'S POLITICAL LEGACY
In authoritarian regimes, structural impediments have prevented
the emergence of democratic opposition and the evolution of political
openness into a real democratic transition. These impediments have
become more important as a result of the nature of relationships
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between ruling elites and state institutions, society, and foreign
patrons. Egypt, like many other third-world countries, suffered from
such structural impediments as well as from other impediments
peculiar to Egypt, most of which have perhaps originated from the
authoritarian systems where it is hard to distinguish between the ruler,
4
the political regime, and the "state."
Mubarak's regime had succeeded in taking advantage of structural
impediments-including the ruling elite's control over the state and
society-with a self-serving strategy to survive and maintain the status
quo. 5 Indeed, the ruling elite's monopoly on power constituted one of the
main obstacles to democratization. Specifically, Mubarak and his close
circle exercised control over society through various means such as
oppression, intimidation, and emergency laws. 6 The regime also created
divisions within any group that did not express its loyalty to the ruling
elite and its allies. Larry Diamond properly notes, "the principle
obstacle to the expansion of democracy in the world is [not] the people of
these authoritarian states. The problem is the ruling elites who have
hijacked the structures of state power and barricaded themselves
7
inside."
For decades, Mubarak learned numerous lessons from his
authoritarian counterparts; the most significant was that absolute rule
requires allowing a degree of freedom of expression and political
openness, given that traditional sources of legitimacy have faded away.
Such a strategy prevented an explosion (as in Romania) or a collapse (as
in the Soviet Union). Political openness, however, required an
accompanying ability to crush the opposition and to control society
through all available means. Those means were topped by soft power
tools, such as less aggressive methods, including "the divide and rule
strategy," "buying the elite's loyalty," and enacting laws that tighten the
government's grip over society and political parties.8 The point of all this
was to avoid weakening the ruling elite and to prevent the emergence of

4. See H.E. Chehabi & Juan J. Linz, A Theory of Sultanism 1: A Type of
Nondemocratic Rule, in SULTANISTIC REGIMES 3, 11 (H.E. Chehabi & Juan J. Linz eds.,
1998) (discussing "the blurring of the line between the regime and the state").
5. For more detail, see AL KUWARI (VJ1,l6), DESPOTISM IN CONTEMPORARY ARAB
REGIMES (

.9II 4.ii

,

.i

'JI) (2005) (Leb.) (discussing authoritarian regimes

manipulating citizens).
6. ABDEL-FATTAH MADY, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: ELITE POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND
THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN THE ARAB REGION 51 (2005).

7. Larry Diamond, Can the Whole World Become Democratic? Democracy,
Development, and International Policies 21 (Apr. 17, 2003) (on file with the Center for the
Study of Democracy), available at http://escholarship.orgucitem/7bv4b2wl.
8. MADY, supra note 6 (examining political attitudes in the Arab region towards
democratization).
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a democratic opposition, thus impeding a recurrence of the Polish, the
Philippine, or the Mexican democratization experiences. Further,
Mubarak had learned not to trust the outcome of truly democratic
elections in order to avoid going through an experience similar to that of
Hungary or Chile.
Moreover, if Mexico-where the technocrats were in power and
participated in their county's democratic transition-is compared to
Egypt, 9 it becomes evident that the ruling party in Egypt had succeeded
at keeping a tight grip over both the old guard and those known as the
new generation (the so-called Future trend within the ruling party, led
by the President's son and a group of businessmen).1° The party had
also attracted independent politicians who won parliamentary seats
without being nominated by the ruling party.1 '
Among the factors that helped the ruling elites maintain their
control over society and hinder democratic transition was the sectarian
issue between Muslims and Copts. The ruling party utilized fear of
12
sectarian unrest to justify its attempts to maintain the status quo.
In addition, for decades public pressure remained mild in Egypt.
The demonstrations that took place were usually motivated by economic
or regional rather than political causes. 13 Although new forms of
political activism, such as the Kifaya movement or blogging, had become
part of the political scene, they had failed to attract more than a few
hundred supporters in a country of eighty million people in 2007.14

These activities had not led to the emergence of a moderate leadership,
and the political discourse could not rally diverse political forces. In
2011, the youth and protest movements managed to mobilize huge
numbers of people by using social networks. As discussed below, social
networks have enabled mobilization of the people and execution of

9. See generally Diane Singerman, The Politics of Emergency Rule in Egypt, 101
CURRENT HIST. 29 (2002) (explaining Egypt's government's use of military law, political
regulation, and military law as a basis to retain state control).
10. See generally,MADY, supranote 6, at 64-65.
11. Abdelgafar Shokr, Independents in Elections, in 2010 PEOPLE'S COUNCIL
ELECTIONS 87-88 (Amr Hashim Rabie ed., 2011).
12. This conception is common in the Arab countries. For example, in April 2008, the
media reported a statement by the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh that the conflict
with Houthis in the south was hindering his adoption of his election program. See, e.g.,
Jane Novak, State of Emergency in Yemen, ARMIES OF LIBERATION (Apr. 22, 2008, 6:28
PM), http://armiesofliberation.com/archives/2008/04/22/state-of-emergencyin-yemen.
13. Rabab El-Mahdi, Enough!: Egypt's Quest for Democracy, 42 COMP. POL. STUD.
1011, 1013 (2009).
14. Id. at 1018.
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political action, and have become an important obstacle for the survival
of the authoritarian system. 15
Formal opposition parties in Egypt certainly did not play the typical
role of opposition in democracies, which is to say they did not
necessarily represent different social groups or compete for power. They
did not even undertake the role of opposition groups that seek true
political transition. On the contrary, the Egyptian opposition parties
helped the regime in acquiring legitimacy, contained the true
opposition, and sabotaged any attempt at creating democratic alliances.
Some of these parties ran to appease the regime who rewarded them
with benefits and offices. 16
On the other hand, due to the confusion between "the state," "the
political regime," and "the government," the ruling elites portrayed the
opposition groups as threats to the regime and national security. Such
arguments justified giving more power to security apparatuses and to
the army. Similar justifications were also used for curbing rights and
17
freedoms as well as for militarizing the entire country.
In Egypt, the country in which the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and
many other Islamist groups were born, Islamists had been deprived of
their right to participate in political life through official parties or
organizations since 1954.18 The regime regarded all Islamist groups as
dangerous and sometimes labeled them as terrorists who sought to
threaten the status quo and subvert the ruling regime. According to
official discourse, the existence of the MB was the reason to stay away
from political reforms. 19 The official argument was that "truly free
elections would lead to the 'Algerian problem,' or to 'one vote, one time,'
meaning that a newly elected government would end elections or
20
restrict them to the point of meaninglessness."
Egypt has been classified as an authoritarian and nonfree country
in most international indexes, as shown in the table below.

15.. Marko Papic & Sean Noonan, Social Media as a Tool for Protest,STRATFOR (Feb. 3,
2011, 9:54 AM GMT), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110202-social-media-tool-protest#
ixzz22KfBMkO0.
-A
j), THE CRISIS
16.. For political parties in Egypt, see: WAHEED ABDELMAGED (
1-.y)
-J-'I
(2008).
. "
OF DEMOCRACY WITHIN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL PARTIES
17.. See MADY, supra note 6, at 112-13 (discussing how "external factors," such as
outside aggression, are used to justify "survival of the regime").
18.. MADY, supranote 6, at 51.
19.. Id. 108.
20.. Id. 108.
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Table 1: Egypt's international ranks
Index

Rank

Score

Corruption Perceptions
Index (2011)a

112/183

2.9/10

Judicial Independence
(2011-2012)b

41/142

4.8/7

Rule Of Law (2011)c

-

-0.42

Voice & Accountability
(201 1)d

-

-1.13

Press Freedom Index (20112012)e

166/179

97.50

Freedom House (2011)f

Freedom Rating:
5.5

Not Free

a. Source: Transparency International, availableat http://www.
transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/corruption perceptions-index_2011. Scores range from 0
(highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean).
b. Source: World Economic Forum, Country/Economy Profiles: Egypt, available at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2011-12/CountryProfiles/Egypt.pdf. Scores range from
1 (heavily influenced) to 7 (entirely independent).
c. Source: World Bank, available at http://info.worldbank.org/ governance
/wgi/mc -chart.asp. Point estimates range from about -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond
to better governance outcomes.
d. Source: World Bank available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance
/wgi/mc.chart.asp. Point estimates range from about -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond
to better governance outcomes.
e. Source: Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2011/12, available at http:// www.
nationsonline.org/oneworld/press-freedom.htm.
f. Source: Freedom House, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011 /egypt.

II. MUBARAK'S ECONOMIC LEGACY

The role played by economic factors and the repercussions of the
economic situation in the choices of elite groups and politicians, and in

320

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

20:1

their communication strategies cannot be overlooked. 21 The economic
needs of many social classes ensure balance to this equation: material
benefits in return for political loyalty. 22 Economic need is also the
backbone of the ruling elites' dependence on foreign actors. Indeed, the
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s affected the economic
performance of governments by shrinking growth rates and raising
inflation rates. The crises themselves were insufficient to put an end to
authoritarianism, but the mismanagement of the economic crises was
one of the reasons for the erosion of the legitimacy of authoritarian
23
regimes.
In Egypt, there were many opportunities to exploit and overcome
the economic crises due to a variety of factors, most importantly the use
of financial means arising from either natural resources or foreign
backers. Businessmen and medium-sized business owners were
interested in maintaining the status quo as long as their interests were
not subject to direct threats, especially in light of the government's
tendency to bring major businessmen into its entourage and to grant
them political and parliamentary seats. Ruling elites tolerated
corruption, bribery, and abuse of authority, thus maintaining the status
quo for numerous individuals and communities. 24 If those communities
were ever to shift their loyalty, the cost of oppression would increase,
and the position of the ruling elites would become weaker, thus
facilitating democratic transition. This may now be taking place in
25
Egypt and other Arab countries.
Economic factors play an influential role in the processes of
democratization; in some states political transition requires an economic
move toward a free market, as was the case in Eastern European
countries in the early 1990s. The Egyptian economic system was free
after the implementation of the World Bank reform program in the

21. See Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman, The PoliticalEconomy of Democratic
Transitions,in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 72, 77-79 (Lisa Anderson ed., 1999).
22. For more details, see, for example, Kurt Weyland, The Politics of Corruption in
Latin America, 9 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 108 (1998) (distinguishing corruption from
political patronage and discussing corruption generally); ANDRP BANK & THOMAS
RICHTER, NEOPATRIMONIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: OVERVIEW,

CRITIQUE AND ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION (2010) (identifying the dependency of
the client to the patron).
23. See generally Omololu Fagbadebo, Corruption, Governance and PoliticalInstability
in Nigeria, 1 AFR. J. OF POL. SCI. AND INT'L REL. 28 (2007) (examining Nigeria and
describing how the poor economy is due, in part, to the authoritarian regime that was in
place).
24. See CHATHAM HOUSE, DEFINING AND TACKLING CORRUPTION (2008), available at

http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182782.
25. See MADY, supra note 6.
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1990s. 26 Yet, the Egyptian economy has suffered from significant
imbalances at the macro level and was also negatively affected by high
corruption rates and the presence of a group of businessmen in Ahmad
Nazifs government in July 2004.27
Table 2: Basic economic data in Egypt
Indicator

1981

1991

2001

2005

2006

GDP (PPP)
per capita,
(Current
International

1,406.268

2,654.290

4,051.913

4,762.119

5,156.672

GDP per

3,418.944

4,508.064

5,675.467

6,074.286

6,371.669

411.195

2,121.207

5,544.049

7,692.857

8,663.394

878.615

1,474.481

1,282.766

1,505.957

capita at
constant

prices, (EGP)
GDP per
capita at
current

prices, (EGP)
GDP per
capita at
current

587.422

prices, (US$)
Source: IMF WEO Online database, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=32&pr.y=7&s
y=1981&ey=2017&scsm=l&ssd=l&sort=country&ds=.&br=l&c=469&s=NGDPR%2CNG
DPRPCH%2CNGDP%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPRPC%2CNGDPPC%2CNGDP

26. This structural adjustments program focused on "conditionalities," i.e. conditions
for obtaining new loans from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, or for
obtaining lower interest rates on existing loans to reduce Egypt's fiscal imbalances. This
program, which was supposed to allow Egypt's economy to become more market-oriented,
included major changes-basically privatization, the reduction of trade barriers, reduction
in government expenditure, and deregulation. See Factsheet, IMF Conditionality,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr
/facts/conditio.htm.
27. World
Economic Outlook Database, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx
(click
on
"By
Countries," select "Middle East and North Africa," select "Egypt," select the appropriate
national accounts, then choose the date range from the dropdown box).
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DPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CPPPSH%2CPPPEX%2CNIDNGDP%2CNGSDNGDP
%2CPCPI%2CPCPIPCH%2CPCPIE%2CPCPIEPCH%2CTMRPCH%2CTMGRPCH%2C
TX RPCH%2CTXGRPCH%2CTXGO%2CTMGO%2CLUR%2CLP%2CGGR%2CGGRNG
DP%2CGGX%2CGGXNGDP%2CGGXCNL%2CGGXCNLNGDP%2CGGSB%2CGGXON
LB%2CGGXONLBNGDP%2CGGXWDN%2CGGXWDNNGDP%2CGGXWDG%2CGGX
WDGNGDP%2CNGDPFY%2CBCA%2CBCANGDPD&grp=0&a= (last visited Mar. 27,
2013).

Indeed, the World Bank program led to increased inflation and
economic instability. 28 As in many other authoritarian regimes,
Mubarak's government remained politically stable due to the support of
Washington and international financial institutions on one hand, and a
29
facade of both a multi-party system and elections, on the other hand.
Nevertheless, Egypt benefited from the global economic prosperity
during the period between 2005-2008, before the recent financial crisis.
This prosperity was due to rising oil prices, the Gulf countries' growing
30
investments in Egypt, profits from the Suez Canal, and tourism.
31
Hence, the growth rate has increased, as shown in the figure below.

28. See generally Stephan Haggard, The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's
Extended Fund Facility, 39 INT'L ORG. 505 (1985) (examining the interplay between a
country's political deficiencies and IMF's monetary assistance efforts); Emma C.
Murphy, Legitimacy and Economic Reform in the Arab World, 3 THE J. N. AFR. STUD. 71
(1998) (providing details on economic liberalization programs in Third World countries).
29. See generally GALAL AMIN, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE EGYPTIANS? CHANGES IN
EGYPTIAN SOCIETY FROM 1950 TO THE PRESENT (2001).
30. See Egypt: Economic and FinancialData, MINISTRY OF PLANNING (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://www.mop.gov.eg/MOPMeta/NSDP.htm (providing updated statistics about Egypt).
31. Egypt, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt (last visited
Oct. 3, 2012) (providing general up-to-date information about Egypt, including GDP
growth rate from 2003 to 2011).
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Figure 1: GDP in EGYPT

Source: Egypt GDP, TRADING ECONOMICS, available at http://www.
tradingeconomics.com/egypt/gdp (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).

The World Bank's privatization program has also boosted
international trade, increased investment flows, and liberalized the
economy. In 2007 the growth rate reached about 5 percent due to free
trade treaties with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries
and free trade agreements with Turkey, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
32
countries.
Yet this growth rate was to no avail as a chronic fiscal deficit
remained due to high energy and food subsidies and because of the
corruption associated with subsidies, particularly in the field of energy.
Additionally, high rates of inflation (20.2 percent in 2008 and 10 percent
in 2009-2010) harmed the middle and lower classes. 33 Political
instability in Egypt also led to a decline in the number of tourists,
resulting in declining tourism revenues and investments. Further, with
the revolution in Libya, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians working in
Libya returned to their homes in Egypt, which led in turn to a decline in

32. Marek Dabrowski, Egypt: Political Transition vs. Economic Challenges?, 7 CASE
NETWORK E-BRIEFS 1, 2 (2011), available at http://www.case-research.eu/upload/
publikacja plik/34292976_Ebrief_2011 7_Dabrowski.pdf (providing that the growth rate
was 5%).
33. Monthly Inflation Note, CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT, http://www.cbe.org.eg/MonetaryPolicy/Inflation-Press-ReleaseEN.htm (last visited Nov. 19. 2012) (providing inflation
rates from 2009 to the present).
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remittances. 34 Political instability in Yemen also had a negative impact
35
on traffic in the Suez Canal.
36
Figure 2: GDP growth in Egypt

EGYPT GP GROWTH RATE
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Source: Egypt GDP Growth Rate, TRADING EcONOMIcS, available at
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/gdp-growth (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).

Furthermore, the policies of the ruling military junta and Essam
Sharafs government exacerbated economic and social suffering. The
government's unprepared responses to social and factional demands has
escalated protests and pushed the people to take to the streets and
demand their due. In addition to all this, the situation got worse with
increased demands to fight corruption and prosecute leaders of the old
system. The business and investment climate has been affected by these
events, bringing about an atmosphere of uncertainty about the future.
The growth rate is not expected to exceed 1 percent in the coming
years and the fiscal deficit is expected to increase to 11 percent of GDP
in 2011-2012.37 Among other negative consequences are high public
debt and the decline of international reserves in the Central Bank from
34. See Rocio Sanz, Socio-Economic Profile of Egyptian Migrants Returning From
Libya Due to the Crisis; Sample Analysis (August 2011), INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR MIGRATION, THE MIGRATION AGENCY, CAIRO, http://egypt.iom.int/Doc/lll006ProfilingEgyptian Migrants FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
35. See Marek Dabrowski, Egypt: Political Transition vs. Economic Challenges?, 7
CASE NETWORK E-BRIEFS 1, 2 (2011), available at http://www.case-research.eu/upload/
pubhkacja.plik/34292976_Ebrief_2011_7_Dabrowski.pdf (providing that the growth rate
was 5%).
36. Egypt, supra note 31.
37. Dabrowski, supra note 32, at 3.
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$36.038 million in 2010 to $27.243 million at the end of May 2011.38
Additionally, free trade agreements have contributed to a prevalent
negative perception of globalization. Many view these agreements as
serving the interests of Western countries and of only a limited group in
39
Egypt.
III. PROTESTS
Although political and economic conditions resulted in the growth of
protest movements, it is necessary to point out that Egyptian protests
had not yet started with the call for demonstration on January 25, 2011.
Egypt has a long history of protest, the most recent wave of which began
in 2000.40
The 1977 uprising against Anwar Al-Sadat's economic austerity
measures was followed, in 1986, by the uprising of the Central Security
soldiers of the Ministry of the Interior, which was subsequently
suppressed by the army. In the 1990s, the country witnessed a wave of
violence led by "Jihadist" movements intending to overthrow the
Egyptian regime. This violence was suppressed by the regime, and tens
of thousands of people were sent to exceptional or military courts. 41 In
addition, since the Taba bombings in October 2004,42 Egypt has suffered
a security problem in the Sinai peninsula, which escalated after the
January 25th revolution and ended with the Rafah border attack that
killed sixteen militants.
At the turn of the millennium, Egyptian cities witnessed peaceful
demonstrations about external issues, first in 2000 against Israeli
policies in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and then in 2002 against the
U.S. invasion of Iraq. In 2003, in Cairo, the first coordinated
demonstration between the then ruling National Party and the Muslim
Brotherhood took place. The two organizations joined forces to hold a
huge rally in the Cairo Stadium to condemn American policy in Iraq.

38. Id.
39. See Riad al Khoury, EU and U.S. Free Trade Agreements in the Middle East and
North Africa, 8 CARNEGIE PAPERS 1, 22 (2008), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/cmec8_al-khouri-final.pdf (discussing free trade agreements and perceptions of
"Western-led globalization").
40. Marie Duboc, Socipolitical Mobolization in Egypt, in SOCIAL PROTEST AND CIVILIAN
REVOLUTIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES 143-45, (Nabil Abdelfattah ed., 2011).
41. DENIS J. SULLIVAN & KIMBERLY JONES, GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH, EGYPT: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 29 (2008).
42. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, MIDDLE E./N. AFR. R. NO. 61: EGYPT'S SINAI QUESTION 1
(2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/Middle%2OEast%2ONorth%
20Africa/North%2OAfrica/Egypt/6l-egypts.sinai-question.pdf.
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In the meantime, Egypt witnessed three important developments:
two political and the third related to the labor sector, all concerned with
informal politics.
A. Kifaya Protest Movement
The first political development consists of the emergence of the first
protest movement called "enough" or the Kifaya movement, which
opposed Mubarak's plan for hereditary succession. 43 The Kifaya
movement organized a series of demonstrations against the President
and his plan; however, the protests were surrounded by a large number
of Central Security soldiers. Nonetheless, Kifaya succeeded in achieving
at least two important goals. The first was breaking the psychological
barrier of fear, which prevented Egyptians from criticizing the
president. Kifaya planted the seeds of a culture of social protest. The
second accomplishment was overriding chronic differences and divisions
within the Egyptian opposition and thus forming a protest movement.
Kifaya was formed as a cross-ideological movement encompassing
activists from both the left and right, as well as both Islamists and
independents.
However, the movement has not developed certain tools necessary
for a successful protest movement, such as internal coherent
organization, mobilization strategy, and recruitment means. Kifaya was
also faced with obstacles related to the nature of the rentier state and
clientelism with millions of people dependent on state jobs. Other
obstacles included the divisions within the ranks of the opposition and
Kifaya's shortcomings in building long-term political alliances based on
the basic tenets of democracy. Kifaya failed to mobilize a large number
of people on its political agenda and was unable to impose itself as a
political power with a strong and popular base.44 Thus it remained an
elitist movement in the eyes of many.
B. Labor Protest
Although the Mubarak regime had a tremendous ability to cope
with economic challenges and deal with opposition actors, a wave of
labor protests erupted, making social and economic demands during the
first decade of the twentieth century. 45 Labor protests were not an
43. See Rabab El-Mahdi, Enough!: Egypt's Quest for Democracy, 42 COMP. POL. STUD.
1011, 1012-13 (2009).
44. Duboc, supra note 40, at 146.

45. See generally,Mahmoud Abbas, Egyptian Labor Syndicates:A Revolutionary Vision
(Cairo: Socialist Studies Center, 1996).
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entirely new phenomenon, but they resulted in part from the Kifaya
movement's activities. These protests were independent from the formal
political parties, including leftist and nationalist parties such as the
Altagmoa party and the Nesserist party. The protests were also
independent from the MB.
The state-run Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla
al-Kubra---established by the well-known economist Talaat Harb
(1867-1941) in 1927 and worked by some twenty-two thousand
workers-has a long history of struggle against the government.
Protests at the Spinning and Weaving Company erupted during the
1930s and 1940s, during the 1970s and 1980s, and from 2006 to the
present. 46 As noted, Egypt has experienced major social changes since it
implemented a free market economy in 1991. While the regime
continues to coerce and suppress opposition and civil society, most
Egyptians' living standards and economic conditions have deteriorated.
The recent wave of labor protests is due to the intensification of the
regime's repression and grip on political and labor activities. In 2007,
Egypt witnessed over one thousand protests of various kinds. In a study
by the Land Center for Human Rights in July 2007, entitled "Protest in
the Face of Savagery," 283 protests were monitored in the first half of
2007 alone, across three economic sectors: the governmental sector, the
private sector, and the business sector. During the first half of 2009
there were 432 protests, and another 187 were held in the second half of
2010. 4 7 The report mentions many reasons for these protests; aside from
low wages and high food prices, the main reason listed is the failure of
both the neoliberal reforms and the export-oriented economy prescribed
by World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for Egypt in the
1990s. Many Egyptians believe the World Bank program was
48
responsible for the suffering of the greatest number of Egyptians.
Indeed, in 2010-2011, 25.2 percent of the population lived below the
poverty line (21.6 percent in 2008-2009 and 16.7 percent in
1999-2000).49 In 2008, 15.4 percent of the population was living on less
50
than $2 a day.
46. Id.at 147-49.
47. LAND CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROTEST IN THE FACE OF SAVAGERY (2007);
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS SERIES, http://www.lchr-eg.org/77/77-56.htm (last visited

Mar. 13, 2013).
48. Galal Amin, Egypt and Egyptians in Mubarak's Era (1981-2008) (Cairo: Merit,
2009).
49. Central Agency for Mobilization and Statistics, Egypt ( -,.O.IJ
II
4 4tJ1),
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, CENTRAL AGENCY FOR PUBLIC MOBILIZATION AND STATISTICS,

available at http://www.capmas.gov.eg/pdf/studies/pdf/enfl.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
50. Egypt, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY/
countries/EG?display--default (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (providing general up to date
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Coverage of Egypt by the western media has not focused on these
economic factors, but rather on the oppression of civil society and on
human rights abuses. 51 In fact, Egypt has long been an important U.S.
ally and a major mediating player in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus,
United States' interests have often predominated over Egypt's domestic
politics.
The widespread fraud in trade union elections in 2006 contributed
to the mobilization of workers in demonstrations in 2007. The fraud
closed all legitimate means of expression and allowed those who were
kept out of the elections to mobilize their fellow workers to protest and
establish a network of protesters to provide basic services. 52 Some field
studies have shown that most activists were individuals excluded from
53
participating in the elections.
Privatization, the sale of public company assets, and the early
54
retirement system all threatened the living standards of workers;
there has been no new investment in the firms that own the sold assets.
This has been compounded by the threat created by the 2003 new labor
law.55
Finally, and most importantly, it must be reiterated that these labor
protest movements made nonpolitical demands and remained
independent from the traditional political parties-leftist, nationalist,
and Islamist. The protests confused the ruling party and surprised the
opposition forces, including the Islamists, who did not seem comfortable
with nonaffiliated protest movements. 56 However, from a group theory
perspective, this social mobilization and the accompanying demands are
in essence political, as the mobilization is a form of applying pressure on
decision makers in order to achieve legitimate social and economic
goals. However, this kind of protest also lacked organization and
leadership.

information about Egypt, including GDP growth rate from 2003 to 2011); CentralAgency
for Mobilization and Statistics, Egypt, supra note 49.
51. See, for example, the periodic reports of Human Rights Watch. Egypt, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/egypt (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
52. Duboc, supranote 40, at 156.
53. Id. at 151.
54. Id. at 149-51.
55. Id.
56. See Hossam Tammam (eU"?14,), the Social Question of the Muslim Brotherhood
((J-,J Z L.'P
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130212.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
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C. ElBaradei'sReturn and the Formationof NAC
The third political development relates to the return of the Egyptian
diplomat and Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei and the formation of
the National Assembly for Change (NAC), a group which includes public
figures and representatives from the major opposition parties and the
MB. This movement started its activities by gathering signatures for
seven specific demands. It focused on the electoral process and asked to
end the state of emergency. The NAC also wanted to enable the
Egyptian judiciary to fully supervise the entire electoral process and
wanted to enable civil society organizations-both local and
that equal
It demanded
monitor election.
international-to
especially
for
all
candidates,
opportunities in the media be provided
to
be able to
called
for
Egyptians
abroad
presidential
elections.
It
during
It
also
wanted
exercise their right to vote in embassies and consulates.
to ensure the right for any individual to run in the presidential elections
without any arbitrary restrictions, to limit the right to run for the
presidency to two terms, and to hold elections by National Identity
Number. 57 NAC activists used all possible means of peaceful
demonstrations and strikes. Youth groups within NAC also effectively
used social networks to disseminate human rights violations and to
rally opponents of the regime to take action in the streets.
Given the intransigence of the regime, the regime's continued
refusal to respond to demands and implement reforms, and the blatant
fraud that took place in the parliamentary elections of late 2010, public
58
anger grew and the number of strikes and demonstrations increased.
A few days after the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, following
a popular revolution, youth groups in Egypt called for an "Anger
Revolution" on Tuesday, January 25, 2011 (Police Day). The youth
groups' aim was to denounce regime policies and to ask for genuine
reforms. The groups developed their demands to bring down the regime,
to prompt the departure of Mubarak, and to encourage the drafting of a
new constitution. Media and information technology assisted the youth
59
groups in their efforts.

FOR
CHANGE,
NAT'L
ASSEMBLY
57. The
Seven
Demands,
http://taghyeer.net/who-we-are/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (providing the seven principle
demands of the NAC).
58. See reports by the Land Center for Human Rights. Activity Reports, Social and
i j. IS,..),
Economic Series, LAND CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, (j. / i
http://www.lchr-eg.org/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
59. Youth demands can be found on social media websites. The most important is the
"We Are All Khaled Saed" Facebook page, available at http://www.facebook.com/El
Shaheeed?ref=ts&fref=ts (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
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MEDIA, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, AND PROTEST

Facebook has become a force used by about fifteen million users in
the Middle East; Saudi Arabia and Egypt's Facebook community has
seen the strongest growth among Arabic users as reported in 2010, as
60
the following table shows.
Figure 3: Top five Facebook communities in the Middle East and
North Africa
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Source: Carrington Malin, 15 Million MENA Facebook Users - Report, SPOT ON PUBLIC
RELATIONS, May 24, 2010, http://www.spotonpr.com/ mena-facebook-demographics/ (last
visited Mar. 13, 2013).

In fact, youth movements have led Egypt's protests using social
media networks to mobilize and ask people to demonstrate. These
movements were affected by what happened in Tunisia and became
convinced that Tunisia's success in toppling Ben Ali proved that they
could overthrow Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. 61 The most prominent youth
movement was the April 6th Movement, which asked Egyptians on
Facebook to support the demands of al-Mahalla al-Kubra's workers in
their strike on April 6, 2008.62
60. CARRINGTON MALIN, SPOT ON PUB. RELATIONS, MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
FACEBOOK DEMOGRAPHICS 3 (May 2010), available at http://www.spotonpr.comwpcontent/uploads/2010/05/FacebookMENA_24MaylO.pdf.
61. Sarah Ben Neffissa, 18 Days of the Egyptian Revolution, in SOCIAL PROTEST AND
CIVILIAN REVOLUTIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES 305 (Nabil Abdelfattah ed., 2011).
62. See 6 APRIL YOUTH MOVEMENT, http://www.6april.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2012)
(official website); see also David Wolman, The Techie Dissidents Who Showed Egyptians
How to Organize Online, ATLANTIC, Feb. 3, 2011, available at http://www.theatlantic.com
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Although a revolution requires organization, leadership, funding,
and mass appeal, social networking media certainly facilitates
publicizing messages rapidly and broadly as well as launching a
massive call to action in seconds; however, social networking does not
necessarily motivate people to go to the streets and fuel a revolution. In
fact, the rise of youth protest movements can be explained by the end of
the media monopoly in recent years and by the emergence of
independent newspapers, satellite channels, talk shows, and social
networking sites on the web. Such means have enabled protesters to
disseminate information, post YouTube videos, communicate, and
circumvent state control. Satellite channels and talk shows have helped
shed light on socioeconomic problems. Newspaper articles by
well-known writers, youth -blogs, and Facebook pages have all
contributed to expose the gravity of the emergency law and the ruling
63
party's policies.
In the recent protest movements, a number of activists used social
media tools. They created Facebook pages and groups, Twitter accounts,
and personal blogs to mobilize their fellow activists, communicate their
message, and ultimately take on street action. Following the death of a
young man in Alexandria in June 2010, the Facebook page 'Weare all
Khalid Said" was created to disseminate information about Said's death.
The page gradually expanded to contain political debates on the
brutality of the regime and the need for reform. 64 Wael Goniem was one
of the administrators of this page. Ghonien was a notable Internet
activist during the Egyptian revolution and was on the "Time 100" list
of one hundred most influential people of 2011.65
ElBaradei was among the figures who took advantage of social
media tools to disseminate information and communicate with his
supporters. 66 Omar Afifi, a former Egyptian police officer, was another
activist who participated in the revolution using social media tools. Afifi

/technology/archive/2011/02/the-techie-dissidents-who-showed-egyptians-how-to-organizeonline/70734/ (discussing gathering online as a way around laws possibly preventing a
gather of more than five people).
63. Sarah Ben Neffissa, Mobilization and Revolutions in Mediterranean Arab
Countries, in SOCIAL PROTEST AND CIVILIAN REVOLUTIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES 44-48,
(Nabil Abdelfattah ed., 2011); Sarah Ben Neffissa, 18 Days of the Egyptian Revolution, in
SOCIAL PROTEST AND CIVILIAN REVOLUTIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES 311, (Nabil Abdelfattah
ed., 2011).
64. Nahed Eltantawy & Julie B. Wiest, Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution:
ReconsideringResource Mobilization Theory, 5 INT'L J. COMM.1207, 1213 (2011).
65. Mohamed ElBaradei, Wael Ghonim: Spokesman for a Revolution, TIME, April 21,
2011, available at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2066367
2066369,00.html.
66. Eltantawy & Wiest, supra note 64, at 1213.
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wrote a book in 2008 advising people how to avoid police brutality. 67
Following the Tunisian revolution, on January 14, 2011, he continued to
advise people from the United States via YouTube videos, Facebook, and
Twitter, giving advice on topics such as peaceful protest techniques,
68
where protesters should gather, and what they should wear.
Although the government restricted the Internet and cell phone
calls during the early days of protest in an effort to curb the
demonstrations, the government's attempts at repression failed as
protesters used other ways to communicate and displayed a high degree
of flexibility in networking. 69 Satellite TV shows, especially on Al
Jazeera, continued to contribute to mobilization against the regime.
The use of the Internet has had an effective impact on mobilization
and protest, yet changes in Egyptian culture have also contributed to
mobilization and protest. Some argue that networked society is the
important factor in mobilization and protest, and not solely the means
70
of the Internet or phone communications (networked communication).
In addition, a successful revolutionary movement should be able to
appeal to groups that do not use the Internet. As in most developing
countries, the middle and working classes, retirees, and rural
individuals might not have access to the Internet.7 1 In Egypt, young
people who use social networking tools were not alone in the revolution,
as youth from poor districts, who do not use social networking tools,
joined them. The list of martyrs' names has proven this fact, as a large
72
number of the martyrs came from Cairo's slums.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-YYheiPStXtY&
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69. See Adam Knowlton, Networked Egypt: The Networked Society and the
Democratization Movement in Egypt (May 3, 2011) (unpublished student coursework,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln), available at http://www.academia.edu1334173/
NetworkedEgypt_- The -NetworkedSociety-and-theDemocratizationMovement in
Egypt (discussing the failure of Egyptian forces to restrict internet access and the impact
of that failure).
70. Id. at 9.
71. Neffissa, supra note 61, at 305-06.
72. Id. at 305.
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Furthermore, among the drawbacks of social media is the lack of
security;73 It can be exploited by those in power, as was the case in
Egypt. The authorites monitored protesters' Facebook and Twitter
accounts, cut the citizens off from the Internet and cell-phone calls, and
ultimately arrested about forty leaders of the April 6th Movement.74 The
government subsequently used social media for its own purposes,
spreading disinformation to weaken the protest movement.
Leadership is crucial here, as some analysts believe that "while the
effectiveness of the tool depends on the quality of a movement's
leadership, a dependence on social media can actually prevent good
leadership from developing." 75 In the case of Egypt, youth protesters
have not developed a leadership beyond the virtual world, either before
or after January 25, 2011.
V. THE TRANSITION PERIOD

Based on other regime transition cases in different parts of the
world, there is a need for agreement among the major political forces on
what should be done to achieve the desired political system. In Egypt,
the majority of political forces that participated in the revolution have
identified democracy as the needed political system, yet there have been
major differences among political forces regarding two aspects of
76
democracy.
The first difference concerns the particulars of the desired
democratic system, such as the parliamentary structure, the executive
structure, the relationship between the executive and the legislature,
the electoral system, and party organization.7 7 The second point of
difference is how to reach democracy while managing the transition
period smoothly.78 Many mistakes and mismanagements have been
73. See generally Bruce Etling, Robert Faris & John Palfrey, Political Change in the
Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of Online Organizing, 30 SAIS REV. 37 (2010)
(discussing the use of digital networking to affect political change and the adversities
faced in its implementation).
74. Marko Papic & Sean Noonan, Social Media as a Tool for Protest, STRATFOR (Feb. 3,
2011, 9:54 AM GMT), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110202-social-media-tool-protest
#ixzz22KfBMk00.
75. Marko Papic & Sean Noonan, Social Media as a Tool for Protest,STRATFOR (Feb. 3,
2011), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110202-social-media-tool-protest.
76. See generally, Abdelfattah Mady, What Do We Need From the New Constitution?,
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May
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2012,
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committed by Egyptian political forces during the transition, including
youth protest movements, political parties groups, and the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) taking the power to govern Egypt
79
after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak.
A common belief during revolutions is that people can do whatever
they wish, whenever they wish.8 0 It is true that revolutions urge people
to abandon their state of fear and apathy, yet taking this too far may be
a threat to the revolution itself because people get used to breaching law
and order to assert their rights before a popularly elected government is
established. Popular pressure in Egypt has achieved many
accomplishments since January 25, 2011, but the priority in the
post-revolution period should have been drafting a constitution and
building institutions. The elected government and state institutions
81
could then protect liberties and handle socioeconomic issues.
Many youth protest movements have not realized the value in
prioritizing the creation of political systems. Some activists have
focused on socioeconomic demands, while others have been interested in
appearing in the media and writing to the press. The reality is that the
activists have not devoted their time and effort to building new political
parties or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). More importantly,
the movements have not realized that the transition period should not
be long, but it needs a great deal of compatibility and compromise.
Youth protests movements have also not realized the gravity of
transferring elite disagreements to the general population before
reaching a compromise, and that priority should be given to a
82
law-building institution.
The dispersion of youth demands is another mistake. Some activists
have not seen any need to focus on democracy now, while others have
not understood the seriousness of the politicization of the SCAF. There
have also been individuals who think that the revolution must continue
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until all forms of power are ended or all social and economic demands
are achieved.8 3 Another danger is the political division and ideological
polarization between existing political currents. After the ousting of
Mubarak, some political forces focused on their own interests,
overlooking the national priority of institution-building and the rule of
law.8 4 There is a perception among the political forces that the gains
that have not been obtained will now never be obtained.8 5 The Muslim
Brotherhood's support of the constitutional amendments in March 2011
86
could be understood as a way to obtain the majority in the parliament.
SCAF members have also committed mistakes during the transition
period.8 7 They did not realize that the objectives of the revolution were
not only to overthrow Mubarak and stop his plan to install his son as a
successor. Egyptian generals chose not to do what military leaders did
in Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, the Philippines, Tunisia and, other
countries where the military supported the democracy movements. The
SCAF failed politically in managing the transition when they insisted
on making constitutional amendments and a referendum before
ensuring wide political agreement on the amendments. The result was
that political forces' differences were transferred to the street, which in
turn led to political and ideological polarization among people.8 8 The
SCAF also failed in establishing internal security and clashed with
rebels from August through December 2011. Additionally, the SCAF
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chose to have a weak Cabinet with no real power, which failed to deal
89
with social and economic demands.

VI. THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

IN EGYPT

In the Egyptian transition period, there has been a need for a
national coalition or alliance between the different political parties, as
well as protest groups to manage the transition; such components lay
the foundation for a successful democratic government. This is referred
to as a "democratic, historical bloc." 90 This bloc is considered historical
because it faces a historical challenge after the Egyptian revolution:
building a new political system. It is democratic because democracy
shall be the common priority for the parties involved. Political
differences and ideological contradictions should not prevent alliances
among these parties; they need to work together to achieve a common
goal that paves the way toward proper political and ideological
competition, based upon true democratic rules. Mohamed Morsi, the
first elected president after the revolution, has a historic chance to form
and lead this alliance.
The development of such a historical bloc has at least two
prerequisites. First, the conviction that the common ground and priority
in such a historical moment is for democracy as a system of governance.
Second, the exercise of democracy from within those powers and groups.
To satisfy the first prerequisite, the parties of the bloc should remove
mutual accusations from their political discourse and abandon any
attempts to dig into past files or to anticipate future intentions of
different political groups. The parties should understand that such a
historical moment requires overcoming past discords for achieving a
historical goal that will benefit everyone. There must be a conclusive
and final declaration by the bloc that the priority is to move together
towards democracy; this is what happened in Poland, 91 the
Philippines, 92 and Ukraine. In Ukraine, the opposition was successful
when the groups involved put aside their past disagreements and
89. Id.
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created a coalition in 2004. The coalition was based on a joint program
against the communist president and it was led by a noncorrupt
93
figure.
This approach has been followed by many democratic transitions
around the world. In India and Malaysia, opposition groups reached an
agreement and established a common ground of understanding. Finding
this comion ground led to democracy with all of its principles, rules,
and institutions. India's Congress Party and The United Malays
National Organization represent success stories in which common
ground was established. In South Africa, the Congress Party led the
struggle for integrating the black majority into society by focusing on
democratic representative mechanisms and human rights and liberties.
Furthermore, the different political powers constituting the bloc in
Egypt should work on resolving tensions, which have resulted from
differing understandings of democracy. Disagreements needing special
attention include the relationship between Islamists and democracy; the
issues of social justice, development, and poverty; and finally, the means
to protect minorities. It can be viewed that dealing with the problematic
relationship between Islamic movements and other movements
represents an important dimension of democratizing Egypt.
The second prerequisite (exercising democracy from within the bloc
and between the powers constituting the bloc) is crucial in light of the
presence of many despotic practices within some of the groups. To
achieve such a goal, minimal democratic standards-such as rule of law,
transparency, alternation of power, tolerance, openness, and
self-criticism-must be adopted by those groups. There should be a
complete revision of documents, agendas, and reform projects designed
to eliminate any undemocratic principles. Finally, democratic leaders
should value the country's interests over any personal or sectarian
considerations.
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